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Russian approaches to energy security and climate change:
Russian gas exports to the EU
Jack D. Sharples*
Department of Central and East European Studies, School of Social and Political
Sciences, University of Glasgow, UK
The proposition that EU climate policy represents a threat to Russia’s gas
exports to the EU, and therefore to Russia’s energy security, is critically
examined. It is concluded that whilst the greater significance of climate-
change action for Russian energy security currently lies not in Russia’s own
emissions reduction commitments but in those of the EU, an even greater
threat to Russia’s energy security is posed by the development of the EU
internal gas market and challenges to Russia’s participation in that market.
However, the coming decades could see Russia’s energy security increasingly
influenced by climate-change action policies undertaken by current importers
of Russian gas such as the EU, and potential importers such as China and
India. The challenge for Russia will be to adapt to developments in energy
security and climate-change action at the European and global levels.
Keywords: Russia; EU; energy security; climate change
Introduction
Russia is a major global actor in the sphere of energy, the largest exporter
of natural gas in the world, with the world’s largest gas reserves (BP 2011a,
pp. 20–29), whose own energy security depends to significant degree on security
of exports. With its geographical proximity to the EU and its share in EU-27 gas
imports, Russia is also an important actor in European regional energy security.
Although much has been written about energy security in EU–Russia energy
relations, European literature on the subject (Van der Meulen 2009, Paillard
2010) is often (understandably) Eurocentric and therefore consumer orientated.
Russian perspectives on energy security remain under-researched. This discus-
sion is part of a broader research project that seeks to engage more strongly with
Russian approaches to energy security (Sharples, in press).
Given their differing approaches to both energy security and climate change, and
the importance of their energy supplier–consumer relationship, an examination of
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Russia–EU interaction in relation to energy security and climate change represents
an important contribution to our understanding of both the issues and the actors
involved. In what follows, I develop a critical examination of the Russian perception
that EU environmental policy represents a threat to Russia’s energy security.
Theoretical and methodological considerations
In order to examine Russian approaches to energy security and climate change, I
employ a social constructivist approach, which encourages consideration of dis-
courses as indicators of values and interests of political actors (Burr 2003). Social
constructivism posits that an actor defines its interests through interaction with other
actors. Each actor then constantly redefines its interests (including security interests)
on the basis of the results of ongoing interaction, which Wendt (1999) refers to as a
‘process of mutual adjustment’ (p. 82; Zehfuss 2006, p. 96). Therefore, it can be
argued that Russian conceptions of energy security are based on interaction with other
relevant actors – in this case, the EU as a strategic market for Russian gas exports.
Such interaction is measured through the analysis of communicative interac-
tion between actors, a process referred to as discourse analysis (Wood and
Kroger 2000). In this case, discourses and performative statements known as
speech acts (Chilton and Schäffner 2002, p. 9) are drawn from policy documents
and statements by Russian political actors, Russian analysts, and Russian media.
This approach has already been applied to Russian Arctic policy (Jensen and
Skedsmo 2010), climate change, and environmental security (Trombetta 2008),
and has great relevance to the consideration of energy security, an area in which
actors’ perceptions of their own security depends upon the perceived intentions
of other relevant actors. This is especially the case in a supplier–consumer
relationship such as that between Russia and the EU.
Potential critiques of this approach are anticipated and acknowledged. First, I
aim to identify Russian conceptions of energy security, and then use those
conceptions to explain why Russian actors may interpret EU environmental policy
as a threat to Russia’s energy security. Therefore, statements, policies, and legisla-
tion are critically analysed as elements of discourse, but the analysis of their actual
implementation is not the focus of this discussion. Second, a social constructivist
emphasis on discourses does not discount the role of material interests. Rather, this
approach emphasises actors’ subjective interpretations of their own material inter-
ests and how best to fulfil those interests, thus resolving Neumann’s (2009)
‘dilemma of how to reconcile meaning and materiality, discourse and practice’
(p. 83). Finally, one must be cautious in referring to Russia as a single, unified
actor. There are many relevant actors in Russia, each with their own private
interests and their own interpretations of Russia’s ‘national interest’. For practical
purposes, reference is made to what may be termed ‘mainstream’ elite Russian
opinion, as expressed in interviews with relevant experts and academics, in official
statements by the Russian Government, President, and representatives of
Gazprom, and in articles taken from the mainstream Russian media.
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Defining energy security: Russian conceptions
The Copenhagen School of security studies defines a security threat as ‘an
existential threat to the referent object’ (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 25). The secur-
itisation of energy usually proposes energy supplies as the referent object, with
the existential threat being the denial of such supplies. This approach is reflected
in the International Energy Agency (IEA) definition of energy security as ‘the
uninterrupted physical availability at a price which is affordable, while respecting
environmental concerns’ (IEA 2011b).
Thus defined, energy security represents a consumer-centric concept.
However, as Belova (2011) notes:
There is no single definition of energy security... For Russia, like any other energy
supplier, energy security … [is] more about the security of demand … Long-term
prices, long-term commitments … As the supplier you have to make long-term,
money-intensive investments … How can you do anything in a situation with high
uncertainty?
Such a view is supported by Zolotukhin, who suggests that for Russia, energy
security in relation to gas exports to the EU is a two-way street: it is not only
security of supply for the EU, but also security of market access for Russia, so that
Russia does not lose the opportunity to supply the EU market (Zolotukhin 2011).
The need for consideration of both supplier and consumer interests is supported
at a theoretical level by the possibility of securitising chain reactions – an attempt by
one actor to increase their own security may be perceived as a threat by other actors,
prompting those actors to take actions aimed at increasing their own security,
resulting in a spiral of securitisation which represents a negative manifestation of
Wendt’s ‘process of mutual adjustment’ noted above (Buzan and Waever 2003,
p. 72, Wendt 1999, p. 82). Russian perceptions of EU energy and environmental
policies (which aim to increase EU energy security) as a threat to Russia’s own
energy security are a prime example of such chain reactions of securitisation.
Despite the need for a balanced account of energy security in the EU–Russia
energy relationship, literature on energy security (especially on the issue of
energy security in EU–Russia energy relations) is overwhelmingly oriented
towards security of supply. There is a distinct lack of literature which reflects a
conception of energy security as security of exports and the views of Russian
experts such as those quoted above.
In the absence of such literature, the Copenhagen School approach to security
offers a theoretical approach to energy security that reflects the multidimensional
Russian conception of security of exports as a key aspect of energy security. The
Copenhagen School model of security proposes five (overlapping) sectors of secur-
ity: military, political, economic, societal, and environmental. It is possible to take
Russian conceptions of energy as an economic, political, and social commodity, and
construct a theoretical model of energy security as security of export that includes
the economic, political, and social aspects of energy from a Russian perspective.
Environmental Politics 685
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For Russia, the economic aspect of energy security derives from the importance
of gas export revenues to the Russian economy. Thus, revenues from gas exports are
the referent object for Russia. In 2010, revenues from gas sales represented 12% of
Russia’s exports, 12% of Russia’s GDP, and 6% of federal budget revenues
(Gromov 2011). The economic value of energy exports is reflected in the Russian
Energy Strategy to 2030, which states that ‘The strategic objective of the foreign
energy policy is the maximum efficient use of the Russian energy potential for full-
scale integration into the world energy market, enhancement of positions thereon
and gaining the highest possible profit for the national economy’ (MinEnergo 2009,
p. 55). Potential threats to Russia’s ability to generate such export revenues are
identified in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, which refers to
‘stability of demand and secure transit’ as key aspects of energy security, alongside
security of supply (MFA 2008, section No. 4).
Yet for Russia, natural gas is not only an economic resource. Energy security
is perceived to be a political concept (Grib 2010). The political value of Russia’s
gas exports to the EU lies in Russia’s role as a provider of energy security to the
EU (Nord Stream AG 2011), which increases Russia’s status in its relations with
the EU and contributes to Russia’s position as a ‘strategic partner’ for the EU.
Hence Morozov’s suggestion that Russia’s role as a leading energy supplier to
Europe is not just about money, but also about recognition and identity (Morozov
2010), and Zagashvilli’s proposal that ‘There is not only monetary profit, but
also influence and status’ in Russia’s gas exports to the EU (Zagashvilli 2010).
In Russian society, subsidised domestic heating is important to the quality of
life of much of the population. The ability of Russia’s largest gas company and
monopoly gas exporter, Gazprom, to sell gas to the domestic Russian market at
state-regulated subsidised prices depends heavily on profits generated by gas
sales to the EU, where prices are four times higher (Gazprom 2011). To illustrate,
in 2010, gas sales to the EU accounted for 26% of Gazprom’s total sales by
volume but 44% by revenue. Conversely, domestic gas sales accounted for 56%
of sales by volume but just 29% by revenue (Gazprom 2011).
Gas exports to the EU have great economic, political, and societal signifi-
cance for Russia. Therefore, anything that poses a threat to those exports is likely
to be securitised by Russian actors, including an EU environmental policy that
potentially curbs Russia’s gas exports to the EU. Due to the multifaceted Russian
conceptions of gas as a strategic resource, the securitisation of gas exports is not
only a matter of economic, political, or societal security, but also an issue of
energy security that has economic, political, and societal components.
Energy security and climate-change action: contrasting Russian and
EU approaches
For energy consumers in the EU, policies that increase energy security and attempt
to mitigate climate change are complementary: the development of local renewable
energy sources and increases in energy efficiency will reduce dependency on
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external fossil-fuel energy sources, thereby increasing energy security (of supply) as
well as reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. To this end, in 2007, the
European Council announced targets of a 20% reduction in GHG emissions, renew-
ables to account for 20% of energy consumption (up from 10% in 2008 – European
Commission 2011a, p. 4), and a 20% increase in energy efficiency by 2020. The
purported benefits of these measures will include a ‘major contribution to combating
climate change’, ‘more secure energy supplies’, and ‘€50bn a year less on oil and gas
imports by 2020’ (European Commission n.d.).
Given the combination of Russia’s export-oriented approach to energy
security and plentiful domestic oil, gas, and coal reserves, and growing nuclear
industry, the idea of renewable energy and energy efficiency as increasing
Russia’s energy security was largely confined to the rhetoric of Medvedev’s
modernisation programme during his term as President (President of the
Russian Federation 2010b). In reality, environmental policy has been a far
lower priority for the Russian government than ensuring the security of
Russia’s hydrocarbon exports. From the Russian perspective, environmental
policy and energy security are not as interlinked as they are for import-
dependent consumers in the EU.
Russia signed and ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in the early 1990s, and ratified the Kyoto Protocol
in 2004, having signed the agreement in 1999 (UNFCCC 2011a). According to
the terms of the Kyoto Protocol, Russia agreed that by the commitment period of
2008–2012, Russia’s GHG emissions would be equal to the base year of 1990
(UNFCCC 1998, pp. 3, 20). This ‘soft target’ was intended as compensation for
the massive economic contraction that accompanied Russia’s transition from
communism to capitalism and caused a significant decline in Russia’s GHG
emissions during the 1990s. By 2009 (the most recent available data), Russia’s
GHG emissions were 37% below the 1990 level (UNFCCC 2011b). Therefore,
Russia was far below its 2012 target when Russian representatives arrived in
Durban for the COP17 climate-change conference in December 2011. Yet during
the conference, Russian representatives reiterated Russia’s decision not to parti-
cipate in the second Kyoto Protocol commitment period of 2012–2020, as
originally announced a year earlier at Cancún (Goldenberg 2010).
Russia’s original announcement in Cancún came shortly after a similar
announcement by Japan, and was followed by that of Canada at COP17
(RIA Novosti 2011). Yet unlike Japan and Canada, Russia’s withdrawal was
not driven by an inability to meet its emissions targets. Russia’s proposed
emissions target of 15–25% below 1990 represented little more than ‘business-
as-usual’ (UNEP 2011, p. 16), and Russian representatives confirmed that Russia
would still meet its (now non-binding) emissions target (MFA 2011).
Russia’s representatives have cited the failure of the treaty ‘to provide
adequate participation of all countries, including rapidly developing economies’
(notably the United States, Japan, Canada, and developing countries such as
China, India, and Brazil) as the reason for withdrawing its support for the second
Environmental Politics 687
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Kyoto Protocol commitment period (RIA Novosti 2011). Not only is the Kyoto
Protocol in its current format (with or without Russian participation) incapable of
sufficiently curbing global emissions to reduce global warming, but the collapse
in carbon credit prices (Reuters 2012) has reduced the potential for Russia to
benefit from foreign investment in Joint Implementation schemes. Hence, from
the Russian perspective, there is little benefit from participation in the Kyoto
Protocol second commitment period.
Russia’s representatives have offered support for a universal agreement for
the post-Kyoto period, as proposed by the Durban Platform (UNFCCC 2011c).
A new universal agreement could see China and India increasingly using gas in
place of coal as a means of curbing their emissions (IEA 2011a, pp. 37–39),
which could expand the market for Russia’s gas exports in the future. However,
current disagreements on burden sharing between developed and developing
countries mean that the negotiations over a universal agreement are unlikely to
be concluded quickly or easily.
In light of Russia’s hydrocarbon export-orientated approach to energy secur-
ity and currently limited commitments in relation to international climate-change
action, it may be argued that the significance of climate-change action for Russia
lies not in its own GHG emissions reduction commitments, but in the commit-
ments by those countries to which Russia exports gas, namely those in the EU.
This may account for Russian interpretations of EU environmental policy
(and EU ‘domestic’, rather than Kyoto Protocol, emissions targets for EU
member states) as a threat to Russian energy security.
EU environmental policy and Russian energy security
Russian interpretations of EU environmental policy as a threat to Russian
energy security
From the Russian perspective, the fate of Russia’s gas exports to Europe
represents a chain reaction of securitisation: in seeking to provide for its own
energy security (and at the same time contributing to climate-change action) by
increasing energy efficiency and increasing the share of renewables in its energy
mix, the EU is, in effect, proposing curbing fossil-fuel consumption, including
that of gas. Given that Russia is the largest external supplier of gas to the EU,
such a reduction is bound to limit the volume of Russia’s gas exports to the EU,
thus threatening Russia’s energy security. In 2010, then-President Medvedev
implicitly confirmed this interpretation when he claimed that:
There is the idea of ‘preventive measures’ taken by developed countries as a sort of
carbon protectionism. These kinds of decisions, especially unilateral decisions
aimed at specific countries or groups of countries, could limit export opportunities
for some of Russia’s commodities on international markets and serve as a pretext
for increasing unfair competition against Russia. We therefore need to weigh this
situation up, discuss it, and propose a scheme that would enable us to contribute to
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preventing climate change while at the same time maintaining our economy’s
competitiveness in our main export sectors. You all understand what I am talking
about. (President of the Russian Federation 2010a)
The view that the ‘decarbonisation’ of the EU economy is worrying for Russia
because it creates uncertainties over European demand for Russian gas is sup-
ported by Russian analysts (Konoplyanik 2011a) and, unsurprisingly, by
Gazprom Export:
It is important for Gazprom to clearly understand what gas volumes will be needed
by Europe and what share of this demand will be met with Russian gas. The results
are frustrating. All total-demand scenarios show a decline in gas demand … We
analyzed several available carbon-reduction roadmaps, produced primarily by
consultants and NGOs and concluded that even under the standards set by the
mostly pessimistic EU roadmap, the consensus is that the demand for gas in power
generation will increase from current levels. (Komlev 2012, p. 4)
However, the impact of EU environmental policy on future EU gas demand is
difficult to predict, especially given that future EU gas demand regardless of EU
environmental policy is equally open to question.
The impact of EU environmental policy on EU gas consumption:
a matter of speculation
Given the sheer number of relatively unpredictable variables that will impact
upon EU gas consumption over the next two decades, predictions regarding the
potential impact of EU environmental policy on EU gas consumption and
imports should be viewed with a significant degree of caution. First, the rate of
future economic growth, which strongly influences energy consumption, cannot
be easily predicted. Second, the prices of oil and gas and the relative economic
competitiveness of renewable energy sources also cannot be easily predicted.
Third, it is far from guaranteed that EU targets regarding renewable energy use
and energy efficiency will be met. Taken together, potential future EU gas
consumption and Russian gas imports remain matters of pure speculation.
Thus, there is significant variation in predictions of future EU gas consump-
tion and imports. As a baseline figure, in 2010, the EU-27 imported 117.4 billion
cubic metres (bcm) of gas from Russia, which represented 35.8% of total imports
of 327.7 bcm and 22.5% of total consumption of 521.5 bcm (Eurogas 2011).
Eurogas predicts that EU-27 gas demand could reach 555–606 bcm by 2020
and 575–621 bcm by 2030 (Eurogas 2010, p. 5). The IEA predict that EU gas
demand could rise to 558 bcm in 2020 and 591 bcm in 2030 (IEA 2011a,
p. 104). By contrast, Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) predict
that if the EU goal of a 20% increase in energy efficiency is achieved, EU gas
consumption could fall to 434 bcm by 2020 and to 336 bcm by 2030
(Pipeline and Gas Journal 2009).
Environmental Politics 689
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Gazprom estimates that the EU’s need for imported gas will grow to 380 bcm
by 2020 and to 440 bcm by 2030 thanks to a combination of steadily rising
demand and declining ‘domestic’ EU production (Golubyev 2011). In 2010, the
European Commission predicted that EU gas imports are set to rise to 334–390
bcm by 2020 and 353–404 bcm in 2030 (European Commission DG Energy
2010, pp. 31, 45, BP 2012).
Given the uncertain future demand for Russian gas in the EU, from the
Russian perspective, it appears that the key to maintaining demand is the
continued consumption of gas in the EU as part of a ‘low carbon’ primary
energy mix over the coming decades.
Russian gas as a ‘green fuel’ for Europe?
In an effort to encourage continued consumption of natural gas in Europe,
several Russian actors have attempted to market its gas as the ‘greenest’ of the
hydrocarbons and as a cost-effective solution to the EU’s problem of meeting its
GHG emissions reduction targets. The most prominent of these actors is the
Head of Gazprom Export, Alexander Medvedev, who has stated that in the long-
term struggle for energy security and the reduction of carbon emissions, a
‘correct analysis will show that natural gas can and must play a crucial and
growing role on both fronts’ (Medvedev 2009), and that switching half of
Europe’s coal-fired power stations to gas will result in a 60% decrease in CO2
emissions at only 40% of the cost of doing so through renewable energy
(Medvedev 2010). Whilst such a view should be expected from the head of a
major gas export company, the idea of gas as a transition fuel has also found
support among Russian analysts (Protasov 2011, p. 28, Kokorin 2012) and the
Russian media (Götz 2011).
The extent to which natural gas can feasibly be defined as a ‘green’ fuel
remains open to debate, with critics and supporters offering equally partisan
arguments. Proponents of renewable energy such as Friends of the Earth,
Renewable UK, and the European Climate Foundation have been keen to
emphasise that gas is more carbon-intensive than renewable energy, that invest-
ment in gas is a threat to investment in renewable energy, and that gas is not a
viable alternative to renewable energy (Harvey 2011). Conversely, Russian views
on gas as a bridge to Europe’s energy future have (equally unsurprisingly) found
support among European gas companies, such as Wingas (2010) and BP
(2011b), and among the members of the European Gas Advocacy Forum
(Centrica, Eni, E.ON Ruhrgas, Gazprom, GDF SUEZ, Qatar Petroleum, Shell,
and Statoil; EGAF 2011) who themselves have a vested interest in the continued
use of gas in Europe. According to BP (2011b):
Natural gas used to generate power has half the CO2 emissions of conventional
coal power generation and near zero sulphur emissions. Gas is expected to
displace coal in power generation across the OECD… Coal displacement is likely
690 J.D. Sharples
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 G
las
go
w]
 at
 09
:41
 28
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
4 
to be strongest in Europe, where regulation is most advanced. The gas share in
fossil fuel generation grows from 42% in 2010 to 65% in 2030. Yet the growth in
renewables means that the gas share in total generation increases modestly from
20% to 24%. (p. 53)
Whilst the energy lobby may be powerful in the EU, the European Commission
and its related institutions will determine the regulatory and legislative frame-
work within which energy companies will have to act in the future, and will
influence the energy policies of the EU member states. Therefore, the views of
the European Commission on the future role of gas in the European energy mix
must be considered.
In the Roadmap to 2050, the European Commission supports the view that
natural gas will act as a ‘bridge’ to the era of renewable energy, and perhaps beyond:
‘Gas will be critical for the transformation of the energy system. Substitution of coal
(and oil) with gas in the short to medium term could help to reduce emissions with
existing technologies until at least 2030 or 2035’ and could even be utilised at levels
similar to those seen today in 2050, according to some scenarios. Given the
potential future role of gas in the EU energy mix, the Roadmap also acknowledges
that ‘as conventional gas production declines, Europe will have to rely on signifi-
cant gas imports in addition to domestic natural gas production and potential
indigenous shale gas exploitation’ (European Commission 2011b, pp. 11–12).
This being the case, future EU gas demand looks set to remain significant. If
European scepticism on whether the development of shale gas will prove to be a
‘game changer’ in Europe as it was in the United States (Barysch 2010) proves to
be justified, the ongoing decline in EU states’ conventional gas production will
ensure continued EU demand for gas imports, even in a scenario of limited
increases in overall EU gas demand. Therefore, the greater threat to Russia’s
energy security in relation to its EU gas exports lies not in debates over future
EU gas consumption and the environmental merits of natural gas, but in the
challenges posed by the development of the EU internal gas market.
Further challenges for Russian gas exports to the EU
Politicisation of Russian gas exports to the EU
Until the beginning of the twenty-first century the Soviet Union, and then Russia,
was regarded as a reliable supplier of gas to Europe. Even during the early
1990s, when the Russian economy was going through a difficult transition, the
gas flows from East to West continued uninterrupted. However, during the first
decade of the twenty-first century, Russian gas exports to Europe became
increasingly politicised. Terterov argues that such politicisation would not have
happened but for two events: the expansion of the EU in 2004; and the gas transit
dispute with Ukraine in January 2006, which received a significant amount of
media attention and captured public imagination at a time of high oil prices and
Western political discourses of ‘resurgent Russia’ (Terterov 2010).
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The expansion of the EU in 2004 brought into the Union three former Soviet
states (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia), and four former members of the so-called
Eastern Bloc (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia) which, to a greater
or lesser degree, were united in their occasionally difficult political relations with
Russia and their high levels of dependency on Russian gas imports. The role of
Russian gas in their gas consumption in 2010 ranged from 56% to 100%, with an
average of 78.5% – far above the EU-27 average of 22.5% (Eurogas 2011). EU
expansion therefore increased overall EU dependence on Russian gas.
The Russian–Ukrainian gas dispute of 2005–2006 then exposed the dangers of
such dependency. The conflict was essentially a breakdown in negotiations
between Russia and Ukraine over the renewal of contracts for Russian gas
supplies to Ukraine and the transit of Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine, which
resulted in the halting of Russian supplies to Ukraine and Russian supplies to the
EU via Ukraine for several days. Whilst the intricacies of the conflict have been
considered in detail elsewhere (Stern 2006), what is noteworthy here is the
negative effect the dispute had on European perceptions of Russia as a reliable
gas supplier. The dispute gave a substantial boost to the development of EU
energy policy regarding security of supply and supply source diversification, as
seen in the Green Paper (European Commission 2006) published just months after
the dispute. Subsequent Russian disputes with Belarus (2007) and Ukraine again
(2009) served to reinforce European concerns over Russia as a gas supplier.
The politicisation of Russia’s gas exports to the EU is significant because it
acted as a driver for the three policies discussed below: EU diversification of gas
suppliers, increased gas trading in the EU internal market, and efforts to curb the
powers of energy monopolies (including Gazprom) through liberalisation of the
internal EU energy market.
Increase in supply-side competition on the EU gas market
From the EU perspective, the Russo–Ukrainian dispute of winter 2005–2006
highlighted the dangers of over-dependence on a single energy source, and
fuelled demand for diversification of suppliers. What was traditionally a regional
fixed-pipeline-based market with a small number of external suppliers (Russia,
Norway, and Algeria) is becoming increasingly competitive with liquefied
natural gas (LNG) supplies imported from Qatar, Nigeria, Libya, Egypt, and
Trinidad and Tobago (Eurogas 2011, p. 8). This increased competition has
contributed to Russia’s share of EU gas imports declining from 47.7% in 2001
to 34.2% in 2009, whilst the combined share of Russia, Norway, and Algeria in
EU-27 gas imports declined from 91.7% in 2001 to 79% in 2009 (Eurostat
2011). The increase in LNG sales to the EU was further boosted by the
development of shale gas in the United States, which significantly reduced US
LNG imports, enabling that gas to be redirected to the EU market.
European opinion on shale gas is sharply divided. Whilst France has banned
shale drilling, Poland is actively promoting its development. The European
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Commission has commissioned several reports on legal and environmental
aspects of shale gas production. Whilst shale gas is not expected to reach
production until 2014–2015 (Shepherd 2012), and its widespread development
in the EU is far from assured, any increase in EU gas production represents a
potential reduction in EU gas imports, and therefore poses a challenge to
Russia’s gas exports to the EU.
This increasing supply-side competition has led Russian analysts to consider
the EU gas market to be an increasingly challenging environment for Russia as a
gas supplier, as Yastrzhembsky (2008) explains:
We would need a common understanding of how much gas the EU will require
in say, 10, 20 or 30 years, and how much of that it would expect to buy from
Russia. Then we could align our plans accordingly. Instead, we hear panicky
statements about the need to reduce Europe’s ‘over-dependence’ on Russia.
How can we develop and co-ordinate our energy strategy under these circum-
stances? (p. 36)
Romanova (2010) adds that Russian politicians have expressed the opinion that it
is unfair for the EU to encourage Russia to build pipelines and become hostage
to the European market, while at the same time pursuing diversification.
However, it is not only the potential future demand for Russian gas imports
which worries Gazprom and Russian analysts, but also the level and stability of
prices at which that gas will be sold.
Spot trading as a challenge to long-term contracts and oil-indexed gas prices
Gazprom’s gas exports are made under the terms of long-term contracts (LTCs),
which index-link gas prices to those of oil with a six- to nine-month time delay
and include ‘take-or-pay’ clauses to ensure that consumers purchase at least a
minimum amount for the duration of the contract, which can run for 10, 20, or
even 25 years (Gazprom 2012). However, the last decade has seen an increase
in ‘spot-trading’, whereby gas is traded within the EU with prices based on
supply and demand rather than oil prices. This has been made possible by the
elimination of ‘destination clauses’, which had previously prevented European
energy companies from re-exporting imported gas (Melling 2010, p. 46). The
combined effects of increased LNG supplies to Europe, economic recession and
restricted growth between 2008 and 2010, and the related slump in European
gas demand relative to supply led to spot prices in the EU falling far below the
prices in Gazprom’s long-term contracts. Following these developments,
European energy companies began to pressure Gazprom for a greater share of
‘spot pricing’ in the LTC gas price formula, while several European companies
also appealed to the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) Arbitration
Institute (a well-known centre for the resolution of international trade disputes)
for arbitration on disputes over gas prices (SCC 2012). In response, Gazprom
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offered discounts on LTC gas prices in January 2012 (RIA Novosti 2012a). The
question for Gazprom is whether it will be willing to continue discounting LTC
prices to keep them in line with spot prices, in order to maintain its share of the
EU gas market.
The Third Energy Package and Russia’s exclusion from the EU gas market
In a bid to maintain prices and demand for Russian gas in Europe, a key element
of Gazprom’s European strategy has been to ‘go downstream’ and participate in
gas storage, gas transport, and gas sales to final consumers (Gazprom Export
2012a, 2012b). However, Gazprom’s ability to do so is under threat from the
implementation of EU regulations and directives collectively known as the EU
Third Energy Package, which are designed to liberalise the EU internal energy
market, on the basis that increased competitiveness leads to lower prices. In
particular, Directive 2009/73/EC stipulates the unbundling of the production,
transmission, and sale of gas. This refers to majority control (direct or indirect)
by a single energy company over more than one section of the supply chain.
Minority shareholding in more than one section, however, is still permitted. This
legislation was scheduled to be transposed to the EU Member States by 3 March
2011, and should be implemented by March 2012–2014 (European Parliament
and Council 2009).
As Konoplyanik notes, this legislation applies to non-EU energy companies
that wish to do business in the EU, with violations punished by penalties of up to
10% of that company’s global turnover (Konoplyanik 2011b). Because Gazprom
is a gas producer, this legislation prohibits Gazprom from majority control over
pipeline infrastructure on EU territory or majority control over subsidiaries that
sell gas to final consumers. The Russian interpretation is that Gazprom is being
excluded from the EU gas market (Putin 2012), and that such legislation
represents a threat to Russian energy security, as it undermines guarantees of
price and demand obtained through downstream participation.
As an indicator of future developments, 2011–2012 produced mixed results
for Gazprom. At the end of September 2011, EU antitrust investigators raided 20
companies in 10 Central and Eastern European countries amid concerns over
anticompetitive practices, especially concerning LTCs between Gazprom and
European energy companies (Euractiv 2011), with a formal investigation
launched 12 months later (RIA Novosti 2012b). Also in September 2011, the
European Commission launched legal proceedings against member states that
had not adopted national laws transposing Third Energy Package legislation
related to gas by the 3 March 2011 deadline (Oettinger 2011). These develop-
ments indicate the intention of the European Commission to pursue rigorously
the implementation of the Third Energy Package, and that Gazprom should be
prepared for the consequences. On a positive note for Gazprom, both lines of
Nord Stream became fully operational in October 2012 (Nord Stream AG 2012),
and final investment agreements were signed with Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary,
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and Slovenia for the construction of South Stream’s onshore sections, while final
investment agreements were signed with Eni (Italy), EdF (France), and BASF
Wintershall (Germany) for the construction of the offshore section (Rodova
2012). However, by November 2012, construction had yet to begin, and the
question of Third Party Access (TPA) to South Stream on EU territory
(as mandated by EU energy legislation) has yet to be resolved. Therefore, the
project could yet face significant obstacles to its realisation.
Conclusion
Security of export is a significant component of Russian conceptions of energy
security, which reflects Russia’s status as a hydrocarbon exporter and the multi-
faceted value of gas exports for Russia. Critical analysis suggests that EU gas
import volumes will most likely be sustained despite Kyoto Protocol Second
Commitment Period and EU emissions reduction targets, due to rising EU gas
consumption and declining internal EU gas production (shale gas development
notwithstanding). Unless China and India dramatically increase their gas con-
sumption and imports, and Russia is able to gain a significant share of those
export markets, the EU will remain the most important market for Russia’s gas
exports until at least 2030. Therefore, Russia’s energy security in this period will
depend significantly on developments in the EU gas market, rather than on EU or
UNFCCC climate policy and emissions targets.
Ongoing developments in the EU internal gas market pose a challenge to the
potential future levels of price and demand for Russian gas on the EU market.
The future of Russia’s gas exports to the EU will be determined by several key
issues: First, a long-term solution to the issue of gas transit via Ukraine and
Belarus must be found in order to reduce the politicisation of Russia’s gas
exports. Second, the legal status of Nord Stream and South Stream relative to
the Third Energy Package must be resolved. Third, and most importantly,
Gazprom must adapt to changing conditions on the EU market regarding spot
prices, gas trading, ownership of gas storage and transport infrastructure, and
sales of gas to final consumers. Here, reciprocity is the key, with the promising
potential for future exchanges of minority shareholdings in gas production and
gas sales ventures between Russian and European energy companies.
For Russia, energy security and climate change are not as interlinked as they
are for the increasingly import-dependent EU. However, the period to 2030
represents a potential transition phase, during which current and potential impor-
ters of Russian gas could see their gas imports increasingly influenced by global
climate change action. Post-2030 EU gas imports could be curtailed, whilst
China and India’s gas imports may be substantially higher. To the extent that
energy security and climate change are linked from the Russian perspective,
Russia’s energy security in the coming decades will depend significantly on
climate-change action at a global, rather than national (Russian) level, and
Russia’s ability to use the transition phase to adapt to these developments.
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